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The foundation of the 13,er to 'cqzire legal rights
and i-,Lose legal obligations by contract lies in the neces-
sities of soci il and business relations; and the development
of the lay: of contracts has kert pace with the -rogress of
the society in v.xhich it huas been applied. As the conditions
of society have changed and business interests have assumed
lar-er pvo mortions, two tendencies in the develorment of the
law are noticeable: first, a tendency to enl--gc the scope
of legal comrentency as regarfs the acquisition of contrac-
tual rights; second, a tendency to enforce ;hose rights by
more direct and =ore afdequate romc.ies.
These tendencies have manifested themselves in
various ways.
UnIer t-e Roman Law, the ac 7tuislton f c.ntractual
rights Ieyended entirely Xpon personal -activity. Uo one
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could enforce a contract to which 'ie was not directly a party.
The fundamental principle of their jurisprudence was that each
person must act for himself, in his own name, and in his own
interests. The nearest arT roach to a rccogr±tion of the
doct--ine Df agency was in allowing the enforcement of' contracV
made by a servant of the beneficiary in his behalf or by some
other rerson not individually capable of entering into a
contract. They held strictly to the rule thiat "per liberas
personas, quae in potestate nostra non sunt, acquiri nobis
nihil potest."? The English Law, based to a large extent
upon the Roman, took ur the idea of agency where the latter
had left it. The common law judges at an early day recog-
nized and enforced rights acquired tharough agents, and the
doctrine of agency soon develo-ped into it- zoder'n extent and
significance.
Similarly, in the earilier stages of the law the
rights of an assignee of a contract vwe-e in no way recognized
in the courts. The assignor was the only rarty entitled to
bring action; and if, having done so, he fraudulently ap-
proyriated the l-roceeCs to his own use, or if he refused to
bring action at all, the assignee had no rc-'icfy at law.
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Equity final , iiter'yosed in bohaif Df the assignee, whenever
the assignor endeavored to tahe adva-tage of hiF helplessness,
but beyond this he nould obtain no relief. Later, the courts
of law, implying that the assignor by the adt of assignment
gave tie assignee power to use his name in all necessary
legal .roceedings, so far recognized the rights of the assign-
ee as to allow him to bring action in the name of the assignor.
Again, in cases where money or croperty had been
deposited with one party by another to le paid over to a
third, the courts, after some controversy, allowed the per-
son to whom the money v:' .s to be -aid t; maintain an action at
law against the depositary. Such actions, although arising
primarily out of contract relations, are ot strictly actions
upo.i contract, from which they should be carefully distin-
guihed, The money is not loaned to the -7efendant, but is
simply deposited with him to be paid over to another, no
relation of debtor and creritor being created. The bene-
ficiary has a right to bring acti-n against the delinquent,
not upon an i.yrlied contract with him, but uzpon the theory of
a trust. The action is eociit.ble in its nature. Upon re-
ceiving money to be paid over to another, the dejositary as-
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sumes a duty to the beneficiary to faithfully execute the
trust, and it is this duty which forms the basis of the ac-
tion.
Notwithstanding these liberal tendencies, it has
always remained a general rule of law. that the 1.1aintiff in
an action on contract must be the person from whom the con-
sideration of the contract actually moved, and that a stran-
ger to the -onsideration can iave no right of action; or,
as it is sometimes expreqscd, in an action of assunpsit,
there must be a irivity of contract betv;een the laintiff and
the defendant. The courts, in allowing suit to be brought
upon contracts made by agents, in rermitting assignees to
bring action in the name of the asignor, or in enforcing the
rights of the beneficiary of a trust fund by an action at law,
have created no real exception to this gencral rule. So
far as these classes of decisions have affected the rule at
all, they have merely defined and explained its true appli-
cation. zut some of the early English decisions went far-
ther and granted at least one real exception. This exception
consisted in allowing a stranger to the considoration to sue
on a contract made for la:a benefit, but to which $ne was not
a party. This right w~s allowied by some judges and denied by
others, apparently without any att e( 1t to reconcile their
decisions. Watering between loyalty to :,ocedo: t on the one
side, and a growir tendency tororC. Lreater libcrality in the
enforcement of rights on the other, te courts laid down
numerous conflicting decisions and arrived at no defi.ite re-
sults. A study of these early decisions might be interesting
as showing this struggle, but would hardly be profitable.
Two cases, decided a few years apart will sufficiently illus-
trate the condition of the l:.
In St? rey vs. ,lII, Style's Rep., 2 96 (1651), it
a-ppeared that a father gave certain goods to his son, in
consideration that the son would -ay to the p-lainMtiff to the
action 20 pounds. It was held that the Ilaintiff could
maintain assulpsit on this promise although it was not made to
him. "There is a -:lain contract because the goods were
given for the benefit of the p1 intiff, though the contract
be not between him and the defendant; and he may 'ell have
an action upon the case, for there iA a promise in law made
to the plaintiff though there is not a promise in fact.
There is a debt here, and the assumpsit is good."
_-z-
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In Crow vs. Rogers, 1 Strange, 592, the plaintiff
declared in assimmpsit that "wvhereas one John Hardy was in-
debted to the plaintiff 70 pounds upon a discussion had be-
tween Hardy and the defendant it was agreed that the defendant
should lay plaintiff's debt of 70 pounds and that Hia.dy should
make defendant title to a house." The plaintiff averred
that Hardy was ready to j erfor,. it was decided that as-
sumlsit could not be maintained, because there was no privity
between the parties to the action.
It is probable that, at the time of these decisions,
the weight of authority -.as in favor of allowing a third per-
son to sue on a contr'act made for his benefit.
During this formative period of the law, but one
point seems to have been definitely settled; namely, that,
if the beneficiary of the .,romise was a near relative of the
promisee, the former might maintain an action thereon. The
leading authority in support of this proposition is the fam-
ous case of Dutton and Wife vs. Poole, 1 Ventris, 318, de-
cided about 1670. In this case it apeared that the father
of the plaintiff, being seized of certain lands, was about
to cut timber off them forthe purpose of raising a "portion"
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for his daughter, the plaintiff. The defendant, who had
a reversionary interest in the lands, yromised. the father
that, in consideration of his forbea-ing to fell the trees,
he (the defendant) would pay the said dauvhter 1,000 pounds.
The King's Bench, after considerable discussion and several
re-iearings decided that the dauhter and her husband cpuld
maintain an action upon the promise, although not parties to
the contract. In the qaint language of the Chief Justice,
"It might be another case if the money had been to have been
paid to a stranger, but there it such a nearness of relation
between the father and the child, and t is a kind of debt to
the child to be provided for, that the -laintiff is plainly
concerned. "
For nearly 200 years the authority of Dutton vs.
Poole, seems to have been practically undisputed. Meanwhile
the courts', becoming more and more strict, had gradually
licjitcd the application of the rule that a stranger to the
consideration might enforce the contract made in his favor to
circumstances coming within the facts of that case. And
finally, about 1860, the decision in Dutton vs, Poole was
expressly over-ruled by the case of Tvweddle vs. AtL.inson,
-a-
1 B.& S., 393. Aft.r statin: that t'.e action of assum;sit
was formerly treated as an action of tresyass on the case
and therefore in the nature :f a tort action, Judge Crompton
thus disposes of the whole matter once for all: "The modern
cases have in effect over-ruled the old decisions; they show
that the consideration must move from the Tarty entitled to
sue ulon the contract. It would be a monstrous proposition
to say that a person was a --arty to the contract d for the
purpose of suing upon it for his own advantage, and not a
party to it for the rurrose of being sued." This remark in-
dicates the present position of the English courts; and it
serves to illustrate eo,, as in many other instances, the
conservatism of the English Bench has refused to recognize
a doctrcine which had met the aroval of its most eminent
judges.
In this connection, it is interesting to note that,
although Dutton vs. Poole w:as over-ruled and its doctrine re-
pudiated, it was expressly approved in the recent case of
Todd vs. ',ebber, 05 N.Y., 131. But the chief inportance of
that cease lies in the fact that in Ne. York it has indirectly
formed the basis of the broader princil le that, inderendent
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of near relationship, a third yerson may sue wpon a contract
made for his benefit.
The leading American authority in support of the
yrorzsition that a third person may sue on a contract inten-
ded for his benefit is Lawrence vs. Fox, 20 N.Y., 268; and
the doctrine itself -is familiarly known as the "Rule of
Lawrence vs. Fox. " I have thus outlined the course of the
decisions in England with a view to showing the influences
which were brought to bear urpon our own courts when the same
question arose here for a final determination; and as a
fitting introduction to a discussion of the -.resent extent and
arplication of the doctrine of Laz:rence us. Fox.
LAWRENCE VS. FOX,- ITS AUTEORITY AND. REASONING.
-------------- x---------
The essential facts of the case rof Lavrence vs. Fox,
were that one Holly at the request of the defendant, loaned
the later $300, at the same time stating that he owed that
sum to the yl4intiff Lawrence for borrowed money and had
agreed to ray it to him the next day. The defendant Fox,
in consideration of receiving the said sum from 1iolly,
promised to pay a like amount to the plaintiff the next day.
Fox failed to -ay according to his agreement, and Lawrence
brought this action uxpon the promise made by Fox to Holly.
A non-suit was asked uron the g-round, among others, that
there was no -rivity of contract between the plaintiff and
the defendant. The motion for a non-suit was denied, and
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judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed in the Court of Ajppeal.
Two Judges dissented, and three more, altllough concurring in
the result, 1.laced their decision upon the ground of agency.
The authority upon which the decision rests it at
least doubtful. Judge Gray in the -revailing opinion states
that, as early as 1-06, it was ann-ounce1 by the Suprme Court,
upon what was then regarded as the settled law of England,
that "where one person -akes a promise to another for the
benefit of a third person, that third person may maintain an
action upon it." The rroposition just quoted is taken from
the opinion in Schermerhorn vs. Vanderheyden, 1 Johns., 140,
in which opinion it is further stated that "this was the doc-
trine of the King's Bench in Dutton vs. Poole., From what h
has alnady been said, it is plain that Dutton vs. Poole, was
never authority for so broad a statement; and, as Schermerhorn
vs. Vanderheyden, was decided upon a similar state of facts,
it a-plication also should be confined to cases in which the
promisee and the beneficiary are near relatives. Moreover,
the statement in the latter case is pure dictum, for the de-
cision went against the plaintiff upon other grounds. With
the exception of Farley vs. Cleaveland, 4 Cowen, 432, all the
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other Ne,- York cases relied upon in the opin-io-l- in sun.iort of
the laintiff's ri1rlt of action aru based upon this doctrine
in Scherme-1horn vs. -...... .,of these cases had
done i.nch to stren1 7,thcn the authority of this dictua, but it
is doubtful if the 'int was roally in issue in a-, of them.
In Farley vs. Cleveland, which has often been said to be an
aiitioity up-on this oint; the promise was .:-are directly to
the plaintiff and the case was cited simply to show that the
oral promisc of Fox to fay the debt of 1 olly v;as not void un-
der the Statute of Frauds.
Nor does the prevailing opinion indicate very
clearly the theory upon which the action was sustained. "It
can be regarded at best but as an unsltisfactory though well
meant attempt to base upon -_rinci:-ie what the judges felt
must be recognized as law." Therefore it will -.ot be out of
place to examine at this -oInt some of the exy. latmt ions which
have been suggested in later cases. The decision has been
usually explained either uiron the ground of a trust or of
agency, it is evident that the action can not be sustained
upon the forMer theory for the sim-wie reason that there was
no trust created. in fact, the idea of a trust is expressly
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repudiated in the opinion. In cases in which similar actions
have been maintained upon the theory of a trust, no relation
of debtor and creditor has existed. A fund received under
such circumstances does not become the property of the de-
positary, but must be specifically accounted for by hilf.
This equitable duty forms the basis of the action. In the
case in question, Fox borrowed the money of Holly and it be-
came his property. The relation of debtor and creditor was
created between them; and Fox, in satisfaction of that debt,
promised to pay $300 to Lawrence the next day. If the action
can logically be sustained, it -.ust be upon that promise.
The theory adopted by three of the judges, that the
promise could be considered as made to Lawrence through the
medium of his agent whose action he might ratify, would like-
wise furnish a:L easy solution of all difficulties, if the
circumstances of the case did not plainly show that no agency
was intended or even thought of. Furtherore, our system
of jurisprudence has reached the stage in its progress where
it is no longer necessary to seek the aid of legal fictions
in order to justify any decision which fairness and equity de-
mand. Neither a trust or an agency was created, and we are
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not required to imply the existence of either. It has al-
so been said that, as there was a legal obligation existing
between the -erson to whom the promise was made and the one
who was to receive the benefit of it, the latter becomes so
connected with the transaction that a "privity by substitutio'
is created between him and the promisor. This furnishes a
plausible exrlaination, but it is more ingenious than nec-
essary. There xvas no actual privity between the 'parties to
the action; -and why should he be required to create one by
substitution?
At the close of the o-pinion it is stated that "No
one can doubt that he owes the sum of money demanded of hin,
or that in accordance with his promise it was his duty to
have paid it to the ylaintiff. " Is not this duty, coupled
with an intention that Lavwrerce should hi-ve the right to en-
force it, a sufficient basis ofor the action? When any
person enters into a contract, he does so with the under-
standing that he must either perform it according to its terms
or become liable to an action. The question who is to re-
ceive the benefit of rerformance, as well as the question who
is entitled to bring the action, delends alike upon the in-
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tention of the jarties to the cont-acf; and if, in any given
case, the courts c3n say that a cont-act is intended .rimarily
for the benefit of a thir: yerson, it requires :.o greater
liberality of construction to say that the parties mutually
intend that such third herson should have tho right to en-
force it. Usually a contract doe? rot in express terms in-
dicate who is to sue in case of breach. !I a contract of
the class under discussion, it -c be the intention of the
parties that the Iromisee alone shall be entitled to enforce
it, or that only the beneficiary shall have that right, or
they may intend thsat either may bring action. That they do
intend is a matter of construction. The right of action is
conferred by law as an incident of all contracts; but the in-
tention of the parties must determine who is to enforce that
right.After, in a yarticular case, aseertaining4 this inten-
tion, tei courts have a logical basis upon which to sustain
an action without invoking the aid of a fictional trust or
agency, and without implying a "privity by substitution."
Thit whether or not La7.v'-enco vs. Fox can be said to
be fairly supported by authority, it is sufficient for our
prpose that the doctrine there lair, down has been approved S-
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and followed; and although differences of opinion may ex-
ist as to the reasoning upon which the action in that case
should be supported, one thing is certain--the decision--was
rendered in accordance with the wide spread tendency in
American Law to allow greater liberality in the acquisition
and enforcement of contractual rights. it is too late to
question either the reason or te law. Assuming, therefore,
that the decision is sound both upon principle and authority,
I purpose to examine separately the different classes of
cases in which the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox has been ap-
plied, with a view to determining its :resent influence and
extent in each. But before considering the separate classes
of cases, it seems advisable to lay down the following gen-
eral rules within which, as shown by subsequent authorities,
that doctrine may be ar.7lied; and, as all the requisites
prescribed in these rules were present in the case of Lawrence
vs. Fox, they may be regarded as re-resenting exactly what
was there decided.
I. The contract containing the -romise to 1ay the
third erson -Iust be supported by a consideration ai;d must
be free from fraud or mistake.
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II. The contract must be int(r.,dcd for the benefit of
the third person; that is, such benefit rmst be fairly w'ithin
the contemplation of tne' pxrties to the contract; it -s not
sufficient that he may be inci-c, ntally benefited by its per-
formance.
III. There must be an existing relation between the
rromisee and the t'hird person, and some legal or equitable
duty owing from the former to the latter. The reason for
this requisite is not very apparent. Assuming that the
action is based aTon contract relations, it is difficult to
see upon what principle, if the promise is supported by a
sufficient consider.tion -oving from the promisee to the
promisor, any thing more should be required to render the crom
ise enforceable by the beneficiary.
IV. The doctrine of La.:rence vs. Fox will not be ex-
tended to re T" or doubtful cases, but it1 apilication will
be limited to caseslhjving the same essential facts.
COVENANTS BY GRANTEES OF MJORTGAGED PREMISES.
........- x ---------
It is an ordinary incident of real estate trans-
actions that in a conv.Teyance of mortgaged :roperty the gran-
tee takes the -remises subject to the lien of the mortgage and
as a rart of the consideration of the transfer covenants to
become personally liable for the payment of the mortgage
debt. How far the mortgagee can take aav ntage of such an
agreement, and the ground upon which his right to do so resta,
are questions which have given risc to a great diversity of
opinion in this and other states. in an action upon an
agreement of this nature the case of Lawrence vs. Fox vwas
first applied, and it is in this class of cases that the
doctrine there laid down has received its nost severe crit-
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icismuas well as its most frequent application.
The law has for a long time been well settles3 in
this state that the rranted under such circumstDjncos becomes,
as between the jarties to the trancaction, the principal
debtor and the grantor his .lret and that the undertaking
of the grantee to yay off the incumbrance is a collateral
security acquircad by the nzortgagor for his indemnity. Upon
this assumption, the mortgagee wav: allowed to avail himself
of this agreement, in accordance with the 1-rinciple that a
creditor is in equity entitled to become subrogated to the
benefit of any securities held by a surety for his indemnity.
Before the decision in lawrence vs. Foxthis was regarded as
the only theory liroxi which the gr-Ttor could be compelled to
respond directly to the mortgagee for a deficiency arising
upon forclos're and sale. But in the case of 3urr vs. Beers,
24 N.Y., 178, a dlifferent viev was taken of agreements of
this nature and the liability of the grrantee vras placed upon
another groun. This was an action at law brought against
the graontce before foreclosure upon his covenant to assume
payment of the mortgage debt. As no foreclosure was sought,
and as the mortgagor was not made a -arty, the action clearly
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could not be maintained upon the ,rinciple of the former
cases. Accordingly, the court unani-ously concluded that
"if the judgment can be supported at all it must be upon
the brorI' prinlci-lo that if one person m .es a -romise to an-
other for the benefit of a third- person, that third person may
maintain an action on the promise." Upon this principle the
judgment for the plaintiff was affirmed. A little later
this decision met with the approval of the Commission of
Appeals in the case of Thorp vs. Keokuk Coal Co., 48 N.Y., 25
Here the facts were substantially the same, except that in a
bond accompanying the mortgage, a clause had been inserted to
the effect -that recourse should first be had against the
mortgaged property and the obligors should only be liable for
the deficiency. The action 7 as brought against the grantee
before foreclosure to recover the whole anount unpaid, and
was sust.ined. The court, after spying t:,.t there ha been
some diversity of opinion as to the Zround upon which the
liability of the grantee in such a case must rest, and that
it had finally been de id that it mi-ht rest upon the doc-
t-ine of Lawrence vs. Fox, makes this broad statement:--
"The iefendant upon sufficient consideration acreed to pay
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the amount of the mortgage debt to the plaintiff. This he
agreed to do personally and absolutely, and nt upon the
condition that resort s'ould first be had to the land by
foreclosure of the mortgage. It matters not that the mort-
gagor was not liable to pay personally until after foreclosure,
and that he was then liable only for a deficiency. It would
make no difference if he had not been liable at all the de-
fendant having p.romised upon a sufficient consideration to
pay the debt."
The rule thus broadly stated in Burr vs. Beers, and
reiterated in Thorp vs. Coal Co., has received two impottant
limitations:
(1.) Where the grantee takes title to the premises by
an instrument in effect #mortgage and not by an absolute
conveyance, his agreement to assume the payment of an existing
mortgage cannot be enforced by the prior mortgagee.
(2) Where the grantee agrees to pay a debt for which the
g-antor was not Tersonally liable, the holder of the mortgage
debt cannot enforce such agreement againf st the grantee.
The first limitation w.as established by the case of
Garnsey vs. Rogers, 47 N.Y., 233. The decision in this case
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was handed down by, the Curt of Al:eals at about the saae time
that Thorr vs. KcchiX Coal Co., wars decided by the Conmmission
of A1-eals; and, while the ei iis t'ioislves are not nec-
ecsar~ly in conflict, the Cicta of the two courts show a
vide difference of opinion. :e facts in Garnsey vs. Rogers,
were as follows:-- A conveyance of mortgaged property, ab-
solute in form, had been nade by the mortgagor to the defen-
dant, the latter acsLming pay ent of the mortgage debt.
This conveyance w s shown, however, to have been given upon
parol agreement for redemption by which it appeared that the
whole transaction was intended eyas a security and was
therefore a mortgage. Previous to the foreclosure of the
oriinal -::ortgage, the gr-ntec (roge-s) "e-conveyed the prem-
ises to the mortUgaor by a deed in ich the latter agreed to
re-ac-sume the payment of th e i-ortgage debt. Uon these
facts the question arose whether Rogers, vho ha; for a time
held the land as security for a debt under a conveyance which
was really a mortgage, could be held personally liable upon
his covenant to pay the prior incumbrance. It was decided
that case furnished no occasion for the a-.: lication of the
doctrine of equitable subrogation, as the grantee remained in
-22-
equity the owner of the land, and if any relation of rrincipal
and surety existed he was the :rincipal debtor ald would ul-
timately be obliged to yay the mortgage debt. The court
also declined to hold the grantee liable upon the groumd of a
promise made for the benefit of the mortgagee for reasons
which are forctbly rtated by Judge Rapallo:- "I do not under-
stand that the case of Lawrence vs. Fox has gone so far as to
hold that every promise made by one jerson to a:other from
the 7erformance of which a third would derive a benefit gives
a right of action to such third party, he being privy neither
to the contract nor the consideration. To entitle him to an
action, the contract mist have been for his benefit. He
must be the -arty intended to be benefite. .. ...But in
the present case the agreement was not to apply money which
the promisee delivered for t-e i urpose, or which was due him
from the :-_omisor, to the use of a thir party, but the prom-
isor engaged to advance his own money for the purpose of pro-
tecting the property Df the promisee, which advance when
made .:ould become a lien on the propeety of the promisee.
Regarding the conveyance as a mortgage, the stipulation was in
effect to advance to the promisee on the security of the
-23-
property, to discharge a prior lien, and was made for the
benefit of the promisee only." Itw will be observed that
the case in no way denies the right of a thir. Iperson to
sue on a promiso intended for his benefit; but simply decides
that under the ciroinistances the :romise was not so intended.
Upon this point, the decision in Ricard vs. Sanderson, 41 N.Y.
179, is apparently in conflict; but from thc insufficient re-
port of that case it is difficult to determine exactly what
was there decided; and Garnsey vs. Rogers, must be tahen as
establishing the proposition that a promise made by a mort-
gagee to assume the rayment of a prior incumbrance is intended
solely for the benefit of the mortgagor and can be enforced
by him.
The second limitation above mentioned was stated as
the ground of the decision in Vrooman vs. Turner, 09 N.Y.,
280. The action in this case was brought against the grantee
of mortgaged yremiscs, who had assumed payment of the mortgage
debt in the usual manner. But it appeared that since the
premises had become incumbered, they had passed through the
hands of several intermediate holders, none of whom had
agreed to pay the mortgage;so that the grantor of the defen-
-24-
-!ant was under no personal liability. It had already been
decidcT unrdfe r a similar state of facts thai such an action
could not be naintained UT-n the 7riliciic of an equitable
subrolrtion bec-use no relation of rpri'cijal and surety ex-
istef (King vs. 1T-nitley, 10 Paige, 4C,); and this c.e, al-
though distirr'uished and ayrrarently over-ruled in Thorp vs.
Coal Co., was here ex-ressly ay rcved. The court further
concluded that th defendant could ot be h C0 liable on
the authority of La-rce vs. fox, and the foliowing definite
bounds wvere -rescrib7 vithin vhich the decision in that case
vas aTrlicable- "To givc a third rarty, w o .ay derive a
benefit from the performance, of the -ro'nise an action, there
zust be first an intent by the :,romisee to secure some bene-
fit to the t' ird yarty, and second some privity between the
two, the -romisce and the -erson to be benefited and some ob-
ligation or duty owing from the former to the latter wuich
would 'ive him a leal or equitable claim to the benefit of
the 7romise, or an eriuivalent from him rersonally."
I have considered the above cases somewhat in de-
tail for the reason that the law on this subject as there de-
fined and aplied has remained substantiallyr unchanged. There
-25-
have been -numnr:us later decisions, but av a rule they have
served merely to strengthen the lines drav.n by the earlier
cases.
The -eneral rule, as stated in Burr vs. -L eers, has
been apliod in Cm~nrbeli vs. Snith, 71 N.Y., 26; Hand vs.
Ken-1e1y, 83 N.Y., 1,10; and 'Viger vs. LirL, 134 N.Y., 122.
The last mentioned case might easily have been s.,,r:orted upon
the theory of a- equitable subrogation, but the court pre-
ferred to place the decision u~oL a broader g round of a con-
tract made for the benefit of the Tlaintiff.in Duming vs.
Leavitt, 85 N.Y., 30, it was decided that a aortgagee could
not enforce a covenant, the consideration for which had failed-
The grantee, who had taken -ossession under a warranty .eed,
had been evicted by one holdain a paraviount title; and the
only question in issue wa.s whether this eviction constituted
a failure of consideration. Thorp vs. Acoh.uk Coa l Co., was
distinguished, but the 1-cneral doctrine of that and kindred
cases w-as not -enied.
"he ,o c ora cases following the limitation
established by garnsey vs. Rogers, are P r ee vs. Treat, 82
N.Y., 385; and Root vs. 7'right, 84 N.Y., 72. In the former
-26-
the facts were the same as in Garnsey vs. Rogers, except that
the mortgaged -remises had not been redeemed from the grantee
before the action was commenced. It will therefore be
seen that the doctrine of that case is huere somewhat extended.
The excertion to the general rule granted by Vrooman
vs. Turner, h-os met with uniform approval in the later cases.
The most imrortant is Ddrnhor vs. Rau, 135 NT.Y., 219. The
circu nstances under which this action was brought are some-
what peculiar, and deserve/, some attention. it appears that
the rlaintiff's husband had held certain real-estates subject
to a mortgage in which the wife had joined. He afterwards
sold the ,remises to the defendant who assumed to nay all
incurnbraQnces on the land "by mortgage or otherwise." The
mortgage wvas aftervards foreclosed, the Irorerty sold, and
the plaintiff's inchoate right of dower in the equity of re-
demption cut off'. This action was brought by the wife to
recover the value of her dower interest. The court held
with mbnifest justice that the action could not be maintained.
"There is lacking in this case the relation of debtor and
creditor between the grantor and the third person seeking to
enforce such a covenant, or such a relation as makes the per-
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formance of the covenant at the instance of such third rerson
a satisfaclion of smc legal or equitable duty owing by the
grantor to such person which imust exist according to the
cases in order to entitle the stranger to the covenant to en-
force it.,'
In Gifford vs. Carrigan, 117 N.Y., 257, it was de-
cided that the covenant by ,-1hich the grantee assumed payment
of the inortgare debt, after being acsentoe to and adopted by
the .. rtgagee as a secJrity for his oc':; benefit, was not re-
votable, and therefore a rclease ;y the gartor without the
assent of the :iort-age creditor did not disc--arge the grantee.
This de.cision, because of its -eneral aclicatimn, will be
more fully considered under the discussion as to the revoc-
ability of the promise.
'on the foregoil-ig. examination of t ,e authorities,
the following conclusions are reached as to the rresent ap-
plication of the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox to actions upon
covenants by gZant-es of n:rtgaged rrcmises to pay the mort-
gage debt, assuming in each case, that such covenant is
based upon a sufficient consideration:--
I. The theory of equitable subrogation is no longer a
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necessary -art of the law in actions of this -ature.
"Wfhen the 1 has absorbed, in a bromier equity,
the narrow one enforced in chancery, the form and nature of'
the latter ceases to be of consequence. One does not see'
to trace the river arter it has lost itself in the lahe."
II. A covenant contained in an ;bsolute conveyance will
be rea-rded as made for the benefit of the mortgagee and may
be enforced by him to recover a deficiency - omain~llg after f
foreclosure ad sale, and T-robably before foreclosure to re-
cover the whole amount of the . .rage debt.
III. A covenant contained in a conveyarce Wh-ich Is ac-
tually or in effect a nortgage will be regarded as intended
solely for the benefit of the ,a tc and c :.n be enforced
only by him.
IV. If the -rantor 7os not 1.ersonaily liable to -ay the
rortgage debt, the covenant cannot be enforced by the mort-
gagee.
V. The covenant cannot be enforced by any one having
merely a collateral or contingent interest in the payment of
the mortgage debt.
VI. The covenant, wzoen once accepted and acted upon by
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the mortgage creditor cannot be revoked without his consent.
!CT~ 1T 3 INCOLI1"M PARTNERS.
-9 - - - x-------
The iiablt of iicoir rartners to reaz, ond di-
rectly to creditors upo-l 'is &..creont to assume payment of
the existinz debts of the firm is similar to that of a grantee
of mortgaged !remises, i the right of a creditor to bring
action 1Tron suh romise de'ends i mon the s-.ae -rinci-les.
Here, as in the class of cases just ccnsidcred, the authorit-
ies are clea - that if e ;fi.iso is i etnded for the benefit
of cred.itors it may be cnforced by them. The difficulty has
been to dotoraine i7hetherin a particular case, the rromise
is so intended.
The first attr: i-t to a iy thc !oct ine of Law-
rence vs. Fox in surport of actions upon rromises of this
nature led to an 'immediate conflict of o:i:Aons. In Clafln
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vs. Ostrom,54 N.Y., 58i, it airered that Aron the Iisso-
lution of a y-artnershi! oneof the 7-rtne f sold out his in-
terest to another who orally agreed t- asuiuae payment of the
firm debts, among which was one due the -1aintiff. The de-
fendant guaranteed2 the rerfor-lance of this agreement, and it
was unanimously decider by the Co-inission of Arpeals that the
Tlaintiff could recover directly u'ron this guaranty. The
dicision was rlaced _!Ion the groua that the promise to pay
the firm debts was intended for the benr fit of the firm cred-
itors; and that the guaranty, being collateral to the main
promise "must go with the principal obligation and be en-
forced by the same persons who could enforce that." At
about the same time, the decision in the case of Merril vs.
Green, 55 N.Y., 270, was handed down by the C;'iit of Appeals.
The facts wro r-racticaliy the same, excert that the defendant,
Green as :rinciral and Nicholas as surety, had executel to
the retiring rartners a joint and several bond conditioned
upon the ,ay ent of the fichu debts; and the action wias brought
by a creditor to recover ujron this bond. The court held with
out dissent that the obligors on the bond were liable only to
the obligee named therein; that the agrreement of the defendant
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was made for the p-m.ose of exonerating the retiring partner
from his liability for the firm debts and was intended for
his benefit alone.
There can be little doubt rrom the liguage of the
oy iiionsthat exactly opposite views were t 2ken of this class
of agrc ements. Tattr cases have decided tbn+ he view taken
in Claflin vs. Ostrom, is the correct one, and that such agree
ments are intended for the benefit of the firm creditors (
(Barlow vs. Iflyers, 04 N.Y., 41; Arnold vs. Nichols, 64 N.Y.,
117). If Ve regarK ,Lcil vs; Green as deciding generally
that an agreerment by a yartrer continuing the firm business
to pay t he firm debts canrot be enforced by creditors---which
is undoubtedly what the court ii',tended it to decide---that
case must be considered as over-ruled by the later decisions.
But when rightly understooc- and confin *d to its exact facts,
S0uoK0
the case of ..eril vz.Green, find4 adequate, both in previous
and in subsequent decisions; and the case is of sufficient
iTs1ortfDnce to merit a fey! rewiar-h-[s as to its t'rue wosition and
effect. The action, it will be remeffbered, was brought not
upon a p ... to ray the firm debts, but upon a bond con-
ditioned to becomae void when such debts cere satistied.
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T',cre os >0 obligation excel t tat oU.,fl(J in the bond,
and that .as ex-frcssly to the bl.ce ard for 'is indemnity.
The nir.' .reditor- vrouli -f cour. e be " c_- fittod when the con-
dition in Jhe bond was :'erformed.; but tbe cohdition contained
no -roiise to ray thcm, an' was designed simrly t- furnish a
method by which the ob1>or m _- discharge an obligation
penal in Its nature. Upon this reasoning, it ha-d already
been hold in Tur [ vs. Ri-s, 41 n.Y., 201, that a bond of a
similar nature vwas intended solely for the benefit of the
obli' ee and could be enforced only by him. This case, al-
though not arising out of a rarte'ehir transaction, is
directly in -oint; but curiously ero'-'Ch vias not cited in the
opinion. Later, in Sirnson vs. Brown, 08 N.Y., 355, in an
action against the garantor of a bond, Mocril vs. Green was -
followcd and the reasoningr of that ca.e aiclied ::ithin its
proper bounds.
T'e may, then, state the general rule, as asserted
in Clafli-i vs. Ostuza, that the ronise to -ay the firm debts
7ill be rega-eI as made for the b-ene"i of the firm creditors
anC may be enforced by them; while _o'e-'l vs. Green, must be
considered as establiish'n - a Iiitaon to this general rule
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to the -- eet that i-io: the obli-Ition is i1 thn _'!orim of a
bond conditioned iq!.on the pay-n.ent of the firm indebtedniess
it aan be enforced only by the oblie,e.
This general rule haF received one other limitation
of sor:e i :d.o-tance; namely, that if the agreement is made
generally to ,ay a certain :ortion of the firm debts, it can
not be enforced by any rarticula- creditor. This was de-
cided in the case of Wheat vs. Fice, 07 N.Y., 200, in which
the question arose indirectly upon an agreement to pay
one-fourth of the indebtedness of the firm; and the reasons
are thus stated in the opinion: "No one, nor any specific and
identical creditor, could show in advance of paylent that
the promise was intended for his benefit or covered any part
of his debt. W1hether it 7 o1d benefit him or not depended
wholly upon the undisclosed option of the rlaintiff's dovn
to the moment at which they were required to pay one-quarter
of the indebtedness. It would be a great extention of the
doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox to give a right of action to a
creditor for 'vbost benefit the rromisc might or might not
have been mnrne. To the same effect is Serviss vs. McDonalc
107 N.Y., 260.
In the last mentioned case, -inv i Berry vs. Brown,
107 N.Y., 6E,9, therc are statements indicating that, under
all cl ctmst-rnces, a -r .15e u:, ; ioo:rv -i.2t c'- wou3s be
reg~rfeC as ::adc o_>1" fr the rt the -ro.isee. Again
in Peyser vs. Iyers, 135 N.Y., 509, it is said that, while
the ecui:-ar a c.m iances of that case uc s : as to raise
th,,e i .cat in that the ncv: fIr3 h,. assmrcf the debts of
the old firm. yet the s e fi.cts r-cre insuf iclent to show
the existence of c a -ro-aic as la'iid s-: ort an action
unzer the Aoct7ine of La --e .ce vc. ox. Oosed to these
cicie,_._ the 'c sion vs: an . . AL- , 127 7.*., 39,
'-§:i~ich, alth-'. vot a very st-ong --- e sustain-s the general
doctrine. Whiile these d'icta are of if-iic:Lt i:.]!ortance to
throT o7C Q .-- un t-,.e al, it_ of the ear!ler cases,
a.... indicate a tendency to restrict the' aa cat ion,
foll.in:i- .ositIons , establsd-e bv the er, lier cases,
are believed to eent.the -- esm~t c-n- . tion of the Lao.-
I A,- -,reement by::nczi_"t y-rt :er or )-7 a now
firm continuing the business after diissolution, of the old
fir-.d, to -ay- all the fir-: indebteffis or a s-ecified class
of creditors wil be re.ga-rcod as ma-e for the benefit of such
-~-,'
credito-r,- a:d -y be enforcedJ! by tho2..
II. The doctrine of Lawronc v7, Fox vrlil be sui c-
iertly e,:t, 'nc2 to sustain an action ' :q . - iarx..,ty of such
an a:r 'crc'r-ert.
ITn. A i .7c r, co i tion ed -m -h(- :--.t zf the firm
-cbts c:-? be eo o- L t';c  eblfo 1 c. SCe th--ei n.
IV. A ,rovziso to hay a e.tain -hortion of t-he firm in-
debteIness vithodt sL ecifying -"y rarticular ;7hts..canr.ot
be re-ared as nadec for the bene-it of a--.r o e cre- itor. -and
is therefore enE1-ibio jonlly -the rro: see.
CONTRACTS .7IIT. tT-HE, TA?:.
A somev at anomalous arclication of the doctrine of
Lawrence v. :'ox has been --ade i: oases in which 7--ivate
persons h-ave been injured by public cortractors who had en-
te-ed into a cznt-abt w ±th the state, and in consideration
of some benefit received therefrom haC agreed to pay ary
losses resulting fro ,: their negligence or -. iscofduct. The
first case of this nature, and in fact the only one which
relies to any 'remt extent 'ron Lax:rcnce vs. Fox is Coster vs.
The MLayor, 4 NY., 399. Here it a: eared that, by a special
act of the Legislature the City of Albany had been authorized
to na certain i:7rovelnent- v:ithin the 1 .... li .s.
In accord'ancc with tho provisionis of this act, the city enter-
ed into an agreement unde- seal by Whic> it areed to assLuao
and pay all clai-.1s for e ca1se, to :roortl7 b reason
of the Mahing :f such ir.rovements. A blil-iri- belonging
to the - laintiff h;.ving bcorn undermined, action was -brought
against the city niyon this agreement with the state. It was
hcl& that the w it of *!rivity bcteoe: . the ! arties ,v.s ;-o de-
fense to the ac.t ion, the courts saying that "In this case the
city agreed to z;ay all damages caused tor r an assume
all liability therefor. This was a -romise made to the
state for the benefit of any third rerson to whom property
f'amage .a- causow7. 1,Tor is it a -: anomaly that the liability
which the city assinues is not in existence at the date of its
obligation, nor that the rerson .1ho is to be beneFitted by it
is 4ot then klnown."
Vfrrile a contract of this h in can reasonably be
s.id to be inteded for the benfit of any person who may bo
injured by the ne21igence of the --romisor, it is difficult to
find any -rivity betv~oe> the -- roisee an the " rson, to be
benefitted, and any legal d uty ovwi.ng frorm the former to the
latter,~hich. w~ in- the rathoritie-, 'are es-cntial to the
surrort of T-uc- an action. If such -vit"r and legal duty
exist,_ they are certainry r er- indefinite w.i intangible
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relations. 3ut the quesFtion is not so ;lch whethor the soc-
t-ino of Lawo:-e vs. oex can 0e a-lio: in '1 .ort of actions
of th-is cl.ss, as <hethe_ t:;e l tT t"t'
is neCess-ry. 7ho better or ion o'id seo to bo that suoh
an action . be si-orte -7 :rron the broader -cud that, ir-
rpe ect ivc .f contra - ftins, an action for negll-
L'-tK3c _ i-l O -i i avor of the - arty iau , ainst the party
inflicting the injury. (Sec Robincon vs. Chamberlain, 34
N.Y., 389).
Upon this --rinci-le, seems to rest the true expla-
nc.tion bf the later case of Little vT. -7a-Izs, G, C1.Y., 25---
a case which, if sustined as an action on contract, would
furnish a strihing illustraLion of what a corMon law Judge
once termed "an offer of assu:wsit to all the world." The
defendants in this case had entere,. into a contract with the
state to fuIr.is bound volum.es of t ouart Of A-coals'
Reports to all ia:-bo§:-scicr o_ at -a se0ified -.rIce; and it
was further aireed that for eac'h failure to furnish such books
accord"ing t2 the terms :f the cotract, they vo:il. forfeit to
the Terso, a~grieved the six-, of 3 a.ated. amags
auffered by - in, the smC to be i'ie. for a.,< recoTCcd by
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such -erson. This action was brought uron a failure of the
defendi..nts to furnish boots to the -lai-:tiffs as required by
the contct. At General T' :, a judgment for the Ylaintiffs
was sustained. a-armntly 'ipon the doctrine of Lawrence vs.
rox In the Court of Appeals, this jitd-ment was affirmed,
but t-lo court eviLdenftl' ,o; iw-,-,o it in-nece:7cary to reso~t
to the Ioct'-ine of -'t.D.t ca.c. T'h basis of the -Icsion is
thus statedl in the orinion:- "Contrators with the state, who
assu re, for a consideration -eceive2 ,_-rer the sovereign
rower, by covenant excress or ! clo o d cotain things,
aro.liabie in case of -.olect to ero such covnant, to a
-ivate action at the suit of the :- arty injured 1, such 'o-
slect, and such cont._act inures to the benefit of the indi-
vi-ual -.-o is inte--estc& i, it nforaic. After citing
nunerous cases in surrort of this --torosition, all of which
are 1-Zl ience cases, the o-inio-, :rocec, s "The gr ound uron
which thesc -clecisions are foundec is a broad .i-iiie_ of
ublic r~o!icy essential to the --ublic i' .. We rc un-
able to 7,-c ceivo ;why the <octrine last statocd i,, ithout invok-ing
the rule laid downm in L.:r ,.. c' v-. 7on, is not . iicablc to
a contract of thle f.oscrip_ tion o,_ the one in controversy."
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7hile the mingling of statute authority, co-tract obligation,
and tort 1iability renders the matte' somev.hat uncertain,
the logical inference to be drawn from this la-.guage is that
negligence forms the underlying :-rinci-ie Lu.-cn w ich the
action is basc<. A murin,-, then, that thic: tis the theory
iu:o v-ich actions of this :;aturc are r-orly su::orted, it
follows that there is no occasion for the a!Jlication of
the narrower doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox.
1?I1OR APPLICATIONS.
It has boon decided that a contract of ro-ihsurance
in which the re-insure- expressly a-roes to -.ay policy holders
may be enforced by a Tolicy '.older upon the principle of a
cont,-act made for his benefit (Glen vs. Ins.Co., 56 N.Y., 379
A rccent case of considerale iL*ort nce beering upon this
:-oint is Yfisc vs. T7organ, 13 Daly, 682; s.c., affirmed
without orinion, 103 N.Y. , 402. Here it appearod that a
certain life Insurance Company, in consideration of obtaining
a controlling interet in another, ac-oed that the contract
obligations existing betvceen the latter- comrfany and its rolicy
holders sh -ld be fulfilled to the come eztcnt and in the same
manner as if no change in the Management of the comlrpjny had -
taken place. Defendant and others -uaranteed the rcrformance
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of this agreement. Sometime afterwards, th o comrany having
become insulvent, this action was brought u!ron the guaranty
by a rolicy holder to reco-cr the a .ort due upon his policy.
It was held that the action could not be maintained; that the
guaranty signed by the dofendant amounted to nothing more
than an assurance that theo new cornpany which was thereafter
to conduct the affairs of the old comlpany would recognize and
fulfil all pre-existing contract obligations, and did not
bind him absolutely,under all circiustances, to pay all the
policy holders of the old co,.-zany. The agreement guaranteed
wa.s simp.ly to fulfil the company's contracts "to the same
extent and in the same manner" as if no change in its control
had been made; and all that the caze doci es is that ,nder
such a contract there xvoas no absolute .:romise to iay policy
holders. What the ceoision would have been in an action upon
an ordinary contract of ro-iusurance is not indicated; but,
although, owing to the absence of later decisions, the law
cannot be stated with certainty, there seems to be no reason
why, if the doctrine of Lav,,rence vs. Fox, is to be aplied
at all, it should ;mot be a-1rlie7 to atreements of this nature.
Then a leasehold interest is asgigned, the assignee
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of the lease becomes liable to ray rent to the original
lessor upon the rrivity of estatc c-reatcdcr bctveen thn; &
there ois, of course, no occasion for the aj1:yiCat-on of £-fny
othr ro,'nd of liability. But where there is :nly 'a sub-
letting, or where, for an'y -cason, the ..rc.ci:cr.t iwith the
lessee to ac-siuine osF-ession of t riscs oy ther t
the lessor does rot .:o.nrt iln law to an ass i_7nnt, there is
some inalication that the lessor mi-'it -DLintain an action lqron
such areement withir the r-incirle of Law.. , vz. Fox. In
an early .ass. case, Brewer vs. Dyer, 7 Cushing, 337, the
defendant gave to the lessee of a sho a written rromise to
take the lease an;, -ay to the lessor the rent an, taxes ac-
cording to its terms. AItho . .the agreement was not exe-
cuted wIith sufficient formality to constitute an assi--ent,
the defendant wa Ls held liable to the !ester or taxes and
subsequ...tly accruin1 rent. ?ho ca-e of Vangcheih vs. R.R.Co.
38 N.Y., 346--354, contains a dictum which itimates that
such an action oizht.. be *aintalned. In Lorri ad vs. Clyde,
122 N.Y. , 40 , the conrt co;:sider; the eti- as thoug.
the action were brought by the le--Dr; ut the only issue was
whethor a stipulation coutainei i,1 an a rcoon:ent to form a
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corroration, to the Offect that the eorroraticn when formed
would assume a certain lea-e, could be reg-arde7 as made for
the benefit of the lessee who vT,,. not a Tyarty to the agreement.
While the matter is not of much :ractical urortancc, it is
suggested that the doctrine of Lawrence vs. Fox, might rea-
sonably be a:ilied to an agreement by a sublessee to :;ay rent
directly to the lessor, or to any siuiilar a--Areement4 not
amounting to a_- valid assi-r.nent#.
V here t-ansfers of' real or rer!:o-1al property are
made ubjc.t to the . by the transferee of certain
debts or the e-formance of certain obligations binding u:on
the transferor, the former becomes liable to the rersons
entitled to the benefit of such paynent or rerformanco (Ding-
ledein vc. .R.Co., S7 IT.Y., 57 ; lvs.
100 N.Y., 6130). The liability of the transferee is anal-
agous to that of a -rantee assuming 'aynent of a ritgage
debt; and the agreement falls easily within the -rinci-!ec
of a promise made for the benefit of a third person.
In the forgoing examination of the authorities,
I :-ve collated all tho -ie: Yorh cases of i .r-o-tance in which
The doctrine of L;:,rC.ACC vs. FOx ha' eeO- : - l-c, li-ed1 or
criticiscd. :.:y intention has been, v:it t iscssing to
any extent the justice or visd;.m of the a clication, to
reach conclusions as to the -resent confition of the law in
each class of oases. The d'Lrislo-_I t3 classes has "bcen
made for the sa ze of convenience a d clearness and not be-
cause of any difference of i them. FiniT.ally,
it should be remembere-. that, while i11n soue instances the law
may be considered as definItely settled; in others, whereAm
there are fce'; recent I2eisions, the conclusions reached in
each class rast be taken tith the cauti- t_ hat the :Dresent
tendency of the courts is a-ainst the ;xplication of the doc-
trine.
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REVOCATIION OF. '1Ti7 PR0iE.
x - - - -
There remains one question of i 'iortance to be con-
sidered, and that is whether the promise, from the perf'ormance
of which the third --erson is to receive a benefit,can be rev
revoked without his consent by an agreement between the -ar-
ties to the contract. It is .rcll settled in this state that
after the Iromise has been assented, to a.d adoyted by the
third rerson for his benefit, it is not revocable, and that a
re-leave by the rronisee ,.ithout the consenCt of the third
person does not -lischarge the :rcmsor (Gifford vs. Corrigan,
117 N.Y., 257). in this case. as in neo rly all the others
in which the question has been considcred, the action was
brouhIt by a mortgagee against a - ntee v Po had ass...ed
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payment of the mortgage debt. The ro-lease, -.hich ;as given
after the action had been com-.crced, ,'z held ineffectual.
The decision is based -vcon the -round that the mortgagee,
if he car. sue at all, must at some ti-. e have a vested right
of action. If it did note exist cariler, it :ust have
vested in him the moment the action coanenced. Not that
there is any "especial magic in 3 la7,2 suit", blut beause the
act of b-ringing it shons unuequivocally that the third person
has eacepted the promise and intends to enforce it for his
own benefit . In other Wors, the contract, if revocable
before, ceases to be so when it comes to the h:nowledge of
the beneficiary and is accepted and acted upon by him.
MThile there are numnerous conflicting dicta upon the
subject, the question w:hether the thi- o erson's rights are
defeasible before he has acce- te the -- o--ois-e has never been
passed upon the Court of A-eals. In Hartley vs. ilar-
rison, 24 N.Y., 170, it vs sa-id t-at the 1g-antor could not
upon any princinple release the g.rantec he
was under to the plaintiff in conseqienne of his taking a
conveyance of the premises subject to the -aymcnt of the mort-
gage. His liability to the --laintiff as fixed the moment
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he received the conveyance, and it was -not in the -ower o
of the grantor to release him from it.' Again, in Garnsey
vs. Rogers, which is probablythe bet considered case upon
the general subject, the court, in distinguishing between the
effect of a cov-nai;t contained in ar. absolute deed and in a
mortgage, said that in the former case the agreement was, -"un-
conditional and irrevocable, the grintor cannot retract his
conveyance or the grantee his proraise." But in Kelloy vs.
Roberts, 40 N.Y., 932, and in many later decisions there are
equally strong .d.icta 'o the effect that the promise before it
is accqpt by the beneficiari is revocable; and the court in
A
Gifford vs. Corrigan, while expressly leaving the question
open, seems to favor this view.
The S'roe Court decisions show a similar conflict
of opinion. For instance, in Stephens vs. Casbacker, 8 Hun,
116, the court decided that the promise 'mas revocable; while
in Douglass vs. 71ells, 13 Hun, 58, this case was disapproved,
and it was held that the liability of promiser wi s absolute
and that the beneficiary haf a vested right of action as senn
as the promise was made.
The position ta.en in the latter case see--s to be
more in accordance with the sone-al doctrine of La;:rnce vs.
Fox. if, as 75s said in Vroomarn vs. Turrner, the relation ex-
isting between the third person and the promisee so connects
the former with the tr-ansactiom as to create a "pri\ity Uy
substitution between him and the promisor, this so-called
privity must come into existence as soon as the contract is
made. It follows from this that the third person becomes
virtually a -arty to the contract, aDX must at once beco--e
vestcd ;:ith a right of action .hic> can,,iot be tahen away with-
out -Is consent. The right to sue is vested in him by force
of the agreomcnt itself (Seo Ba.y J. 1'lams, 11 Ill., 91
If the acceptance of the rromisc by the third5 per-son ean in
any way aid the vesting of this right, such assent ought, in
the absence of proof of actual disse:t,to be a le-al presumipt-
ion. Of course, it is a curious rroposition to saj that two
persons may"be competent to make a contract and -not be com-
petent to alter or rescind it at their pleasure. But it
must be remembered that the liability itself is exceptional;
and it is just as difficult to see upon what principle, if
a cause of action has once been created in favor of one per-
son, it may be discharged by another without his consent.
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However this may be, the dicta of the later cases, together
with the -resent tendency to restrict the ajoplication of Law-
rence vs. Box, indicates,that, whenl the question comes before
the Court of Appels, the yromise will be >cld revocable until
it is adoptec I the -erson for whoso bencftit it is made.

